This article argues that peaceful nuclear cooperation – the transfer of nuclear technology, material or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes – helps explain why some countries pursue and acquire nuclear weapons while others do not. In particular, countries that receive peaceful nuclear aid are more willing to launch nuclear weapons programs and successfully develop the bomb — especially if they also face security threats. To test this argument, this article uses a new dataset of more than 2,000 bilateral civil nuclear cooperation (NCA) agreements signed between 1950 and 2000. A number of quantitative and qualitative tests provide strong empirical support. This article challenges conventional wisdom by showing that supplier countries increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation when they assist others in developing civilian nuclear programs. Moreover, the relationship between civil nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad. Even seemingly “harmless” aid, such as the training of nuclear scientists or the provision of research or power reactors, increases the likelihood that states will seek nuclear weapons and eventually acquire them. With a nuclear renaissance on the horizon, major suppliers like the United States should reconsider their willingness to help other countries develop peaceful nuclear programs. Should the United States use conventional ballistic missiles (CBM) to support the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) mission? More importantly, the political-military benefits outweigh the risks of deploying CBM? The United States, as it works to mitigate the risk of misperception and an unintended nuclear response, should use short-term confidence-building measures to support the pgS mission. The rapid response of confidence-building measures would probably be sufficient to defeat many urgent soft targets, provided that there is actionable information available.

Short-term confidence-building measures, i.e. options that can be deployed before 2013, would have the necessary attributes to exceed their objectives: payload flexibility, throwing weight and precision. Specifically, the conventional modification of the U.S. Navy`s Trident is a low-cost, short-term PGS option that would alleviate the concerns of CBM`s adversaries. However, the large-scale use of medium- and long-term confidence-building measures against moving targets and hard, deeply buried targets will require a wider range of technologies that have not yet matured. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to invest in the research and development of a broad portfolio of PGS options in order to achieve the emerging goal. War negotiation models suggest that war ends after both sides have developed an overlapping negotiating space. National mechanisms – national government coalitions, the elite decision-making group on a state`s foreign policy and their role in ending interstate war – are essential in explaining how, when and why this negotiating space develops.

Thanks to preferences, information and obstacles in the trap, wars can “get stuck” and require a change in expectations to create a negotiating space to end the war. A major source of this change is a change in the government coalitions of the belligerents. Events in the United States, China and the Soviet Union during the Korean War illustrate the dynamics of these obstacles and the need for internal coalition changes to overcome them before the conflict can end. 58 Pages Published: 11 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 4 May 2009 End of the Korean War: The Role of National Coalition Changes in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace (PDF) Political Economy: Government Spending and Related Policies eJournal Spreading temptation: Proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements (PDF) Correspondence: Debate on British decision-making towards Nazi Germany in the 1930s Speed Kills: Analysis of the deployment of conventional ballistic missiles Andrew Barros, Talbot Imlay und Evan Resnick antworten auf Norrin Ripsman und Jack Levys Artikel über internationale Sicherheit vom Herbst 2008 mit dem Titel “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? Die Logik der britischen Beschwichtigung in den 1930er Jahren. The Limits of Coercive Air Power: NATO`s “Victory” in Kosovo Revisited Jack S. Levy, Evan Resnick, Andrew Barros, Talbot C. Imlay, Norrin M. Ripsman The Decline of American Hegemony – Myth or Reality? Ein Rezensionsaufsatz. For academic quote: “Correspondence: Debating British Decision-Making With Respect to Nazi Germany in the 1930s.” International Security 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009): 173-198. Over the next two decades, international politics will be shaped by whether the international system remains unipolar or transforms into a multipolar system. Can the United States maintain its primacy? Or will the emergence of new great powers reorganize the distribution of power in the international system? As American power declines, will the dynamics of power change lead to security competitions and an increased likelihood of war? In particular, what are the implications of China`s rapid rise to great power status? If the United States is unable to maintain its hegemonic role, what will happen to the security and economic framework it created after the end of World War II, which has since formed the basis of the international order? In a world that is no longer defined by the United States.

Hegemony, what would happen to globalization and the open international economic system that the United States established after World War II and expanded after the end of the Cold War? This essay reviews five publications that address these questions: Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy; Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New World Order; Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East; National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Changing World; and Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World. International Security, Vol. 34, no. 1, Summer 2009 Public International Law: Foreign Relations & Policy Law eJournal Numerous studies of the 1999 Kosovo crisis argue that although the Air Force played an important role in forcing the surrender of President Slobodan Milošević, the threat of a NATO ground invasion was critical. Other studies claim that such a threat did not exist or that it was not relevant to ending the crisis. Instead, they attribute NATO`s success solely to the strategic use of forced air power. However, there is another explanation: the growing dissatisfaction with the Milošević regime among its supporters as the crisis dragged on. Despite NATO`s overwhelming strategic superiority, Milošević was able to reject the terms of his opponent`s surrender until his political position became untenable. This suggests that the Air Force as an instrument of state spirit may have greater limits than its proponents claim. Nuclear demand, nuclear supply and nuclear behaviour.

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